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COCXPIT RESOURCE M A G E M E N T TRAINAVG:
ARE CURRENT INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL?
Gerald N. Cook

Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in the Spring 1991 issue. It i~reprinted due to its continuing value
and timeliness.
Investigators and members of the National Transportation Safety Board attribute the cause of the
majority of airline accidents and incidents to pilot error. In an effort to address this problem, many airlines
have developed training programs for pilots aimed at improving teamwork and decision making in the cockpit.
Much of this training, generally termed cockpit resource management (CRM), has leadership style assessment
and modification through group exercise as its foundation. Though cockpit resource management training
has been widely embraced in the aviation industry, its effectiveness in improving flight safety has yet to be
demonstrated. An argument is advanced that the current approach to this training is not likely t o be effective.
Other approaches are suggested.

INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the jet age in 1958, commercial
air travel accident rates began a precipitous decline
(Sears, 1989), but by the early 1970s the decline leveled
off and has remained low but nearly constant. Because of
jet aircraft systems' reliability and redundancy, accidents
due primarily to mechanical failure are rare. The human
system failure, the pilot, is the causal factor in more than
70% of commercial airline accidents (Lautman and
Gallimore, 1987).
Researchers at the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) in the early 1970s began
studying ways to further improve airline safety and
concluded that the root causes of pilot error accidents
must be addressed if the accident rate were to be further
lowered. At the same time, flight operations managers at
United Airlines came to similar conclusions from their
investigations at United and other airlines. One accident,
which has since become a classic in the study of pilot
error, galvanized support for a different type of training
for United's pilots. This new approach to pilot training,
now commonly termed cockpit resource management
(CRM), has been adopted by many airlines in an effort
to further improve airline safety.
This paper explores the foundationsof CRM training
-
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and its prospects for success.
CRASH OF UNITED FLIGHT 173
In December 1978, United Flight 173, a DC-8 aircraft
on a scheduled passenger flight from Denver to Portland,
Ore., crashed after the crew delayed their approach and
landing to work on an unsafe landing gear indication.
The flight was routine until the gear extension was
accompanied by a loud thump, abnormal vibration,
aircraft yaw, and a red warning light for the right main
landing gear. Following established procedure for this
abnormality, the flight engineer confirmed all main
landing gear were down and locked by a visual inspection
system designed for that purpose.
Some 28 minutes after reporting the gear problem to
Portland air traffic controllers, the captain contacted
United's dispatch and maintenance center controllers to
discuss the problem. All agreed that the appropriate
procedures had been completed. The conversation ended
approximately 30 minutes before the aircraft crashed. For
the remainder of the flight, the captain's main concern
seems to have been to allow the flight attendants time to
prepare the cabin for an emergency landing.
During that time, both the first officer and flight
engineer made several oblique and unassertive references
to the increasingly critical fuel situation. So oblivious was

-
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the captain to those comments that when the first of four
engines quit and the first officer said, "We're losing an
engine," the captain asked, "Why?" The crew managed to
keep the remaining three engines running for another
seven minutes; the DG8 crashed six miles from the
runway after the fuel was exhausted and all engines
flamed-out (NTSB, 1979).
For many, the crash exemplified what was wrong with
airline pilots and their approach to teamwork in the
cockpit. Foushee and Helmreich (1988) have argued that
both traditional pilot selection and training are, in part,
responsible for these deficiencies. They point out that
many airlines have long favored the military single-seat
fighter pilot for hiring, the type immortalized by Tom
Wolfe (1979) as having the right stuff.
"Most of us are familiar with the common stereotype
of the pilot as a fearless, self-sufficient, technically
qualified, and slightly egotistical individual, whose job
description calls for the defiance of death on a regular
basisn(Foushee and Helrnreich, 1988 p. 191). Pilots who
have this background and self-image are unlikely to
function well in the multi-pilot crew when there is a need
for teamwork and group decision processes. Although
Foushee and Helmreich may have overestimated the
extent to which this personality type is evident in airline
cockpits, some of the attitudes they refer to are common
(Helmreich, 1984).
DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY EDUCATION
FOR PILOTS
At the time of the accident, some United managers
were participating in a training program provided by
Scientific Methods Inc., the organizational development
firm founded by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton. These
managers were quick to note the similarity in the
problems of business management addressed by this
training and those involved in the crash of United 173.
Accordingly, Scientific Methods was asked to develop a
similar program for United's pilots (Oberle, 1990).
Although United was not the first airline to carry out
management training for pilots, its initial commitment to
CRM training was the greatest, making United the
industry leader in this area.
Laboratory Education in Business
Blake and Mouton were the developers of the
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Managerial Grid for assessing leadership styles and were
early proponents of laboratory education in business.
Intensive group experience education, known variously as
T-group, encounter group, sensitivity training, and
laboratoxy education, was developed and used extensively
in many companies for thetwo decades after World War
I1 (Kaplan, 1986).
In the earliest stages, managers from different
companies or work areas were assembled in training
groups but not provided with any specific direction or
given any explicit task. The role of the educator or
facilitator was not to provide structure but rather to
encourage the group members to identify and
communicate their feelings about the group, its work as
it evolved, and its members. This feedback was
considered the most important product of the process
(Argyris, 1964). The objective was to develop an ability
for "openness" that the manager could then use on the
job. Later developments included the use of interactive
work groups and the introduction of a series of more
structured tasks for the group to perform.
Current methods for the management team-building
aspect of organizational development are direct results of
initial work in laboratory education (Lewis, 1975).
Regardless of the training method advocated, scholars
and practitioners believed that controlling, autocratic
leadership styles, to the exclusion of relationships in the
group, were counterproductive (Horstein, Heilman,
Mone, & Tartell, 1987).
Laboratory education was intended to heighten
sensitivity to the importance of relationships. Underlying
teamwork values were the free flow of valid information,
a spirit of inquiry, nondefensiveness, and collaboration.
These qualities seemed the perfect prescription for
avoiding accidents like the Portland crash.
CRM Training at United Airlines
The United CRM program uses the Managerial Grid
as the basis for examining individual leadership style. The
Managerial Grid allows for various management styles to
be depicted on a coordinate system where the X axis
measures concern for production or task behavior with
the Y axis showing concern for people or relationship
behavior.
The course introduction states that when the grid is
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"understood it provides a comparative basis for seeing
teamwork and how individuals contribute to it or prevent
it from occurring by the way in which they interact with
one another" (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 3). This
emphasis is necessary because "well-educated and
technically proficient crew members ...rarely understand
what makes people tick" (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 2).
Yet the skills in working with other crew members are
essential to "reaching informed, strategically sound
decisions and 'taking action accordinglyn (Scientific
Methods, 1988, p. 1).
Objectives of the course are five: (a) gain insight into
one's own style of action, @) set standards for advocacy
and inquiry based on openness and candor, (c) learn
effective use of the captain's authority and crew member
leadership, (d) develop principles of synergistic
teamwork, and (e) understand the impact of external
forces on cockpit behavior.
Small teams of pilots work together intensely for
three and a half days on a series of projects. This
teamwork allows participants to develop skills in inquiry,
advocacy, conflict solving, decision making, and
critiqueing. The developers say these skills will not be
taught but will develop through group interaction. At the
end of the session, team members evaluate each other's
strengths and weaknesses. This sometimes harsh
evaluation by peers is intended to promote reflection and
lead to a change of attitude and behavior.
CRM Training at Other AirIines
Cockpit resource management training, though not
yet required by regulation, has been introduced in some
form at most major airlines. Many programs are
patterned after United's course and most programs use
some form of leadership style assessment and group
feedback
EFFICACY
Despite wide acceptance by the airline industry and
10 years experience in CRM training, there is no
conclusive evidence this training is effective in improving
flight safety. Certainly pilot-error accidents continue to
occur. Nevertheless, an accident is such a low frequency
occurrence that a short-term change in the accident rate
will not be statistically significant in proving the efficacy
of training.
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Some anecdotal evidence, however, has been offered.
United, which had not had a hull-loss accident since
beginning its training program in 1979, suffered two
accidents in 1989. One, a Boeing 747 on climb out of
Honolulu lost a forward grgo door resulting in serious
flight control problems and several passengers being
sucked through the gaping hole in the fuselage.
The second accident occurred when the center engine
of a DC-10 aircraft exploded in flight, resulting in severe
control problems and a spectacular televised crash
landing at Sioux City, Iowa. Both captains credited their
crews' CRM training for reducing the loss of life in these
accidents (Langer, 1990). Still, this testimony is not
considered hard statistical evidence and the vested
interest of United Airlines must be acknowledged.
Helmreich (1984) has argued that CRM training
programs may be effective in changing pilot attitudes but
are unlikely to affect underlying personalities. Further,
there is evidence that personality is linked to pilot
performance, including cockpit management. If
personality is the predominant determinant of cockpit
management behavior, then airline managers should
concentrate on pilot selection rather than on training and
allow cockpit management to gradually improve with the
retirement of those pilots with inappropriate personality
traits.
In research at one airline, however, Helmreich has
found that attitudes toward cockpit management differ
significantly by pilot position, that is, captain, first officer,
second officer. Because personality traits were not
similarly linked to position, it would seem that
personality traits and attitudes toward cockpit
management are independent. In subsequent research at
the same camer, a significant correlation between
attitudes and flight deck performance in cockpit
management was found (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, &
Russini, 1986).
CRM training has been shown to have a positive
influence on pilot attitudes both as measured by pilots'
subjective evaluation of the usefulness of the training and
by psychological testing administered pre- and posttraining (Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee, Gregorich, &
Wilhelm, 1989). If CRM training is effective in changing
pilots' attitudes, it should have a positive effect on actual
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cockpit management.
Helmreich and his colleagues reported preliminary
results indicating CRM training does translate to
improved cockpit management behaviors in actual and
simulated flight (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, &
Chidester, 1990).
The researchers face several methodological
problems.
Perhaps the greatest difficulty is in obtaining
consistency of evaluation from the pilots measuring
cockpit management performance.
Although the degree of efficacy is yet to be
determined, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
(1989), sufficiently convinced that CRM training will be
effective in improving safety, has proposed such training
for all airline pilots.
CRITICISMS
There has been no research on the best pedagogical
methods for CRM training.
This lack of evidence notwithstanding, there are
reasons to question whether programs that place heavy
emphasis on leadership style assessment, feedback, and
introspection are likely to be effective in improving
airline safety.
These questions involve (a) the underlying analysis of
the causes of pilot error accidents, (b) the dissimilarity in
the working roles of airline pilots and business managers,
and (c) the history of ineffectiveness of laboratory
training in business.
Questionable Analysis
Though not ignoring other combinations of task and
relationship attitudes and behaviors, much current CRM
thinking emphasizes the problem combination of the
autocratic, task-oriented captain and the timid,
unassertive subordinate crewmembers as in the case of
the crew of United 173.
Thus, much of the emphasis is on the concern for
people or the relationships dimension of management
style. Data suggests that many pilot-error accidents
involve failures in areas that are the domain of
traditional pilot training programs. In a study of fatal air
camer accidents worldwide from 1977 through 1988,
Sears (1989) found that deviations from standard
operating procedures were a significant factor in 37%.
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Table I
The SignificantAccident Causes and Their Percentage of
Presence in 93 Major Accidents
33% Pilot deviated from basic operation procedures.
26% Inadequate crosscheck by 2nd crew member.
*9% Crews not conditioned for proper response
during abnormal conditions.
*6% Pilot did not recognize the need for go-around.
4% Pilot incapacitation.
*4% Inadequate piloting skills.
3% Crew errors during training flights.
*3% Pilot not trained to respond promptly to GPWS
command.
*3% Pilot unable to execute safe landing or go-around
when runway sighting is lost below MDA or DH.
3% Operational procedures did not require use of
available approach aids.
*3% Captain inexperienced in aircraft type.
Source: The Boeing Airliner AprilIJune 1987
* Factors suggesting a lack of technical knowledge andlor basic
flying skills in the author's opinion.

Training and practice of standard operating
procedures for both normal and abnormal situations are
a large part of traditional pilot training. In its
investigation of two recent accidents resulting from the
failure of the flight crews to properly set flaps for takeoff
(Northwest at Detroit and Delta at Dallas), the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) (1988, 1989) found
in both cases the captains failed to maintain cockpit
discipline and follow standard operating procedures.
In another study conducted at Boeing Aircraft,
Lautman and Gallimore (1987) found that 12% of all
commercial aircraft operators accounted for 90% of all
accidents. Although the study was not scientificallybased,
a series of interviews showed that standardization and
cockpit discipline were common elements of those
operators with the best safety records.
In an early study, Sears (1986) found a lack of
technical knowledge and/or basic flying skills to be a
contributing factor in approximately 30% of air camer
accidents (Table 1).
These findings suggest that more emphasis should be
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placed on task behavior in CRM training.
Dissimilarity of Pilot and Management Teams
To the extent that the importance of relationships
also should be emphasized in CRM training, there is
reason to question whether group exercises are an
effective means of doing so. Since laboratory education
was designed to address the problems of openness in
management teams and CRM training draws directly on
this foundation, significant differences between the work
of management and pilot teams may invalidate
assumptions about the transferability of the training.
Both by tradition and federal law, an airline captain
has absolute authority over the operation of hisher crew
and the aircraft. A manager has similar responsibilities
though perhaps more limited authority. For most
situations the similarity ends here. For all normal flying
situations, procedures for aircraft operations are highly
developed, specific in detail, and intended to be precisely
followed. The same is true for all abnormal conditions
that have been anticipated. Traditional pilot training
emphasizes rote learning and practicing of these
procedures. In contrast, high-level management teams
operate in a world of much less certainty, in longer time
horizons, and in environments over which management
has little control.
Lewis (1975) delineates the conditionsmost favorable
for the operation of integrated management teams most
likely to benefit from team development training. Among
those conditions are: (a) An external environment that is
highly variable and/or changing rapidly; @) an
organization that is young and/or undergoing major
change, resulting in fluid structure, few operating policies
and procedures, and emerging role definitions; (c)
technology that is relatively new and/or developing
rapidly; and (d) a tendency toward frequent use of project
management, temporary task forces, and/or ad hoc
problem-solving groups to augment conventional
organizational structures.
These conditions are not characteristic of the airline
pilot's job and, by extension, team building may be
inappropriate. To the contrary, A r e (1%4)
acknowledges that directive style leadership is
appropriate for routine decisions and extreme
emergencies. These, in fact, are exactly the working
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conditions faced by airline pilots. A well-known adage
among pilots characterizes their job as hours and hours
of boredom interspersed with moments of sheer terror.
Continuity is an additional significant difference
between management teams and airline crews. Though
management team memgrs can be expected to take
some time to get to know one another, develop working
relationships, and then work together for an extended
period, it is common for airline pilots to meet for the
first time and one hour later to have to function as a
highly integrated team performing a complex task. At
larger airlines, it is also common for a crew to work
together for one month and then possibly never again.
Such teamwork can be accomplished only by adherence
to detailed standard operating procedures.
Effectiveness of Laboratory Training in Business
Laboratory training programs for management, which
are the basis for many CRM programs, eventually proved
disappointing even to their advocates. Chris Ar@
(1979), who championed the cause of laboratory
education for many years, eventually concluded "there
may be factors endemic to the theory and practice of the
laboratory education that act to inhibit transferability" (p.
197). Kaplan (1986) concludes that laboratory training
failed for two reasons: (a) some participants were hurt in
the process and their working relations damaged, and (b)
those who felt positive about the process were generally
unable to apply what they had learned in the training.
There is evidence that both of these problems are results
of current CRM training.
Although reporting a positive shift in attitudes by
most pilots participating in CRM programs, Helmreich
et al. (1989) have found a negative reaction in about 15%
of those trained. The data indicate those pilots reacting
most negatively are low in both task and relationships on
the grid measurement system. These are the pilots judged
to be most in need of improvement.
Although the developers of the United CRM
program deny it, elements of T-group and sensitivity
training are certainly involved (Public Broadcasting
System, 1986). During a sales presentation of the course
to this author, the Scientific Methods representative
explained with apparent satisfaction how he had
witnessed senior captains and, in one instance, a chief
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pilot, break down and cry before the group during the
final evaluation.
As Jack Gordon (1989) sees it, this "personality
shredding is a pretty fair description of what went on in
some sensitivity training sessions, and that at least a few
people were seriously wounded" (p. 29).
Problems can occur elsewhere even when training
does not involve such direct feedback as was
characteristic of early sensitivity training. Following the
breakup of AT&T, Pacific Bell instituted a corporatewide program called Leadership Development. The
company's director of training noted that the program
"was a long way from sensitivity training" (Gordon, 1989,
p. 38). Nonetheless, following complaints by some
employees and an investigation by the California Public
Utilities Commission, the program was dropped. These
results could have been expected. In an early article
advocating T-group training, Argyris (1964) cautions that
individuals who are highly defensive should not be
involved in the training.
The second reason cited by Kaplan for the failure of
laboratory education is that even when participants had
a positive reaction, they frequently had difficulty applying
what they had learned once they returned to the job.
Given this difficulty, positive effects are short-lived.
Similar criticisms have been leveled at CRM training.
Walker and Youngblood (1989) note: "Some of the
existing programs rely heavily on self-analysis without
emphasis on actually working together or giving skills to
use while working in the cockpit. While self-analysis may
give some personal insight into individual styles of
management, it does not deal with how to apply skills to
working better with other crew membersn (p. 56). The
difficulty sterns from an emphasis on attitudes and
motivations rather than on behaviors. To be effective,
training programs must identify behaviors that are
objective, observable, and measurable (Luthans, Maciag,
& Rosenkrantz, 1983, cited in Kirkpatrick, 1988). Most
CRM programs fail to define the cockpit behaviors that
should result from the training program.
NEW APPROACHES TO CRM TRAINING
Current approaches of CRM training have been
questioned by others. John Lauber in his presentation to
the Annual Airline Operations Forum, Airline Safety in

JAAER, Winter 1995
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol5/iss2/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.1995.1145

a transitional era (November, 1988), stated his concern
that "some of us have fallen into the dangerous waters of
hot tub harmony. What I mean by this is that I see signs
of too much emphasis on interpersonal relationships in
some of the approaches to-cockpit resource management,
and not enough emphasis on command and leadership
skills." Doug Schwartz of Flightsafety International
describes an evolution from first-generation CRM
programs, which emphasized open communication,
teamwork, and advocacy, to training that will provide
specific and measurable cockpit behaviors (Hughes,
1989).
The foregoing criticism is not intended to suggest
leadership style analysis has no place in pilot education.
In fact, an appreciation of the various leadership styles
can provide valuable insights into pilots.
Given evidence that such attempts have not been
successful in business settings, and in the absence of
explicitly defined behaviors to be used in the cockpit, the
question is what amount of scarce training time should
be spent in an attempt to modify existing pilot attitudes
and leadership styles.
There are other elements of CRM training, some old
and some more recently developed, that promise to be
effective.
Standard Operating Procedures
First, the importance of strict adherence to existing
standard operating procedures must be emphasized. Case
study of accidents, particularlywhen video recreations are
available, should be effective. Strong flight operations
management support is critical to the development of
norms requiring the use of standard procedures.
Safety Monitor
Procedures can be developed that delegate the role
of safety monitor to the non-flying pilot, who should be
responsible for challenging any deviation from standard
procedure in much the same way that a challenge to a
deviation from a stabilized approach profile is now
required.
There are circumstances when deviation from
standard procedure is appropriate, but the reasons for
such a deviation must first be fully established and
explained to the crew. The safety monitor also would
bring to the attention of the flying pilot information
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Table 2
Error Chain Elements

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Ambiguity
Fixation and/or Preoccupation
Confusion or Empty Feeling
No one flying the aircraft
No one looking out window
Use of undocumented procedure
Violating minimums and/or limitations
Unresolved discrepancy
Failure to meet targets
Departure from standard operating procedure
Communication failure

Source: Schwartz (1989)

critical to the safe operation of the aircraft (Bolman,
1979).
Error Chain
Most accidents result from a unique series of events
and errors, no one of which may be uncommon or, in
isolation, would lead to an accident (Sears, 1986). If this
"error chain" could be detected and broken while in
progress, accidents could be avoided. Flightsafety has
developed a list of clues that may point to an error chain
in progress (Table 2) (Schwartz, 1989).
Decision Processes
Although decision making is frequently mentioned in
CRM training, the actual process is seldom more than
superficially explored. It seems an assumption has been
made that if sufficient openness in the cockpit can be
instilled, good decisions will certainly follow. Many
decisions in aviation are highly structured and program-

mable, consequently detailed procedures exist for most
mechanical problems. But pilots also occasionally face
non-programmable decisions that are left to pilot
judgment. The aviation community has generally felt that
pilot judgment is either inzate in good pilots or acquired
over time, but were not a proper subject of formal
training (Buch & Diehl, 1984).
This attitude is in contrast to business management
training, which devotes considerable effort to developing
business judgment. Understanding the classical decision
model and practice in its application to aviation problems
can be effective.
CONCLUSION
CRM is not the only avenue being explored to
improve the safety of air travel. The newest generation of
commercial aircraft make extensive use of computers to
automate functions that previously required pilot control.
Though the introduction of high levels of automation
presents new cockpit management problems (Wiener,
1989), there is reason to believe that these newer aircraft
will be safer. Because pilot error continues to a major
contributor to commercial aircraft accidents, work to
improve the human system holds the greatest promise for
improving airline safety. Formal CRM training is more
than 10 years old and has been adopted by most airlines.
Preliminary research results indicate the training is
effective in improving cockpit management behaviors.
There is no research on the relative effectiveness of
various approaches to CRM training, but there are
reasons to question whether approaches that emphasize
assessment and modification of leadership styles through
group exercises will be effective. Until research results
are available, CRM training should de-emphasize the
study of leadership styles so that other promising
approaches to training can be included.0
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